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Summary 
This paper examines whether investment treaties impose too much constraints on host states 
actions and if  that is the case, what can be done to remedy that issue. This is done by 
providing an oversight of  the applicable rules that stem from the investment treaties and then 
discussing a few controversial awards originating from international arbitration. The 
international investment regime has been criticized in a number of  ways, a few of  the 
common arguments against the regime are taken into consideration. Lastly, this paper offers a 
suggestion on why and how to modify the current regime in a way which tries to remedy 
some of  the criticism while still offering acceptable protection for the investor.  
Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats undersöker huruvida investeringsavtal innebär för mycket begränsningar för 
värdländernas handlingar och om så är fallet, vad som kan göras för att åtgärda problemet. 
Uppsatsen erbjuder en översikt över några vanliga gällande regler som återfinns i 
investeringsavtal och går sedan vidare med att diskutera några internationella skiljedomar. 
Internationella investeringsavtal har kritiserats på flera olika punkter, en del av kritiken 
kommer att tas upp och beaktas. Slutligen erbjuder uppsaten ett förslag på varför och hur en 
skulle kunna ändra det nuvarande systemet på ett sätt som försöker åtgärda en del av kritiken 
och samtidigt erbjuda ett godtagbart skydd för investeraren.  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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and purpose 
Should a foreign investor be able to sue a host state in an international forum, if  the state 
changes its laws in a way which is unfavorable for the investor? Concerns have been voiced 
that the framework applicable for foreign investors gives them too much power, and that the 
ability to sue in an international forum gives the states lower incentive to change their laws for 
fear of  paying a large sum of  money in compensation to the investors. These concerns have 
been raised, inter alia, in the ongoing process Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of  
Australia. In this case the democratically elected state representatives decided to pass a law 
which in detail regulates the appearances of  tobacco packaging, in a way unfavorable for the 
tobacco companies. 
A necessity for Philip Morris to be able to sue Australia in an international forum is the 
existence of  an investment treaty or Bilateral Trade Agreement (BIT) which includes an 
investor-state arbitration clause. A BIT is a treaty between two states in which legal rights are 
given to a third party, the investor.  In the absence of  a BIT, the investor would be forced to 1
turn to its home nation for diplomatic protection. Of  course, resorting to diplomatic 
protection means that the investor has to rely on its home-states benevolence.  In the 2
following chapters I will discuss the major problem that the BITs set out to solve, but also the 
problems which in turn is introduced by the BITs. 
1.2 The Problem 
When an investor considers making an investment in Country X, the investor needs to look at 
the current regulations offered by Country X. Country X might be very investor-friendly in 
the sense that it wants, and needs, investors to invest in the country. Therefore, its internal 
regulations provide favorable conditions for foreign investors, for example by low or absent 
income tax. The investor, seeing that the other relevant conditions (weather, terrain, natural 
resources and so forth) also favor him or her, might be very tempted to make a commitment 
 Evans, Malcom (eds.) International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. pp. 741-746.1
 Evans, 2014, p. 747.2
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and invest in Country X, relying on these favorable regulations promised by Country X. But 
the investor must also consider the following: the investment is most likely associated with 
several startup costs, with the effect that once the investment has been made it might not be 
economically viable for the investor to abandon the investment. Once invested, the investor 
makes a long time commitment to its investments, and also to Country X.  
Country X knows this, so the question is: what stops Country X from luring with promises of  
no taxation in order to attract investments, but once the investments have been made the 
country removes the favorable regulations which attracted the investors in the first place? 
Country X can benefit from the fact that it is not economically viable for the investors to 
abandon their investments once the investments have been made. The country has the 
opportunity to change its regulations in favor of  its own interest and in the disfavor of  the 
investors interest to a certain degree without losing the investment.  
Even if  Country X has no intention of  doing this, the investors know that Country X can do 
this, and if  Country X cannot provide some kind of  mechanism of  trust, the investors might 
choose not to invest for fear of  Country X later abandoning its investor-favorable regulations.  
To solve this problem, which earlier has been called ”the dynamic inconsistency problem”  or 3
”the problem of  obsolescent bargains”  (henceforth, "the dynamic inconsistency problem"), 4
Country X signs an investment treaty. By signing an investment treaty Country X obliges to 
appear at an international court if  so requested by the investors, and Country X also obliges 
to concur with a certain treatment of  the investors and/or the investment. This treatment is 
vaguely defined in the investment treaties through mainly two means: by a general treatment 
standard and through regulations regarding expropriation.  
For the sake of  clarity, it is important to note that the problem appears in two different but 
similar situations: the state and the investor might be in negotiations directly, but they can also 
be negotiating only "indirectly". An example of  the direct negotiations is when a state wants 
 Guzman, Andrew. Explaining The Popularity Of  Bilateral Investment Treaties. Oxford University Press; 2009. E-book. 3
pp. 5.
 Salacuse, Jeswald. The Law of  Investment Treaties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. pp. 271.4
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to let an investor operate public services, while an example of  the latter is if  a state tries to 
promote investment by letting everyone who fulfills certain criteria establish themselves under     
favorable conditions. In the latter case, the investor would not establish a contract with the 
state, thus the relationship between investor and state is governed by law, which the state can 
unilaterally alter.  
The treaty tries so solve the above mentioned problem by giving a mechanism of  control to 
the investor through investor-state arbitration and obligations imposed on the host state to 
treat the investor in a certain way. Should the host state not fulfill its obligations the state can 
be hold liable and compensation will need to be paid. The question this paper will examine is 
whether the treaties impose too much constraints on the host countries actions, and if  that 
turns out to be the case, how the investment treaty could be modified while still offering 
acceptable protection for the investors.   
1.3 Method 
This paper will mainly be utilizing the method of  legal dogmatics, which could be defined as  
using interpretation on generally accepted sources of  law as a way to analyze a certain issue 
or field of  law.  In the international context the sources of  law is foremost international 5
custom, general principles of  law and treaties.  Awards from different courts and from 6
international arbitrations may also be seen as sources of  law, but their status is debatable, 
especially in the context of  international investment law. 
The first questions my paper will examine in regards to the problem mentioned above is: 
which are the applicable rules, where do they come from and what do they entail? This will 
be done solely through the legal dogmatic method, by arbitrations awards and through 
interpretations of  standards found in international treaties. With that said, the subject of  
international law differs somewhat from domestic systems, and the method of  legal dogmatics 
might not always be applicable in the same sense as when dealing with domestics systems. 
The existence of  international custom, where one needs to find an opinio juris to verify the 
 Korling, Fredric and Zamboni, Mauro (eds.). Juridisk metodlära. Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2013.  pp. 21.5
 Evans, 2014, p. 91.6
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existence of  an international rule is to some extent a method of  its own.  In effect, I will be 7
studying academic papers much further than if  one would use the same method in for 
example a Swedish domestic context.  
1.4 Current research 
There are several textbooks to choose from if  one wishes to get a general overview of  the 
international investment law regime, for example The Law of  investment treaties by Jeswald W. 
Salacuse or Principles of  International Investment Law by Rudolf  Dozer and Christoph Schreuer. 
With that said, this paper will look at certain elements within that regime, and getting an 
overview of  the literature regarding those elements are harder. That does not mean that there 
is a lack of  academic literature, but this literature is to be found in different publications such 
as The European Journal of  International Law rather than in book-form. While studying this 
subject I have read several articles from different publications, some which I will reference to 
and others for inspirational purposes. One thing can be said of  this kind of  literature, and 
that is that many have a political agenda and the reasoning contained is often based on 
arguments rather than on empirical studies. There seems to be a lack of  empiricism in 
regards to the issues at hand, unfortunately this paper will not be able to remedy this as 
collecting empiric data in this field is a huge undertaking.  
1.5 Disposition 
This paper will begin with an overview of  the history of  investment law and a section on 
some of  the more common contents of  an investment treaty. Following that section will be an 
overview of  some of  the criticism against the investment treaties. Lastly I will present an 
alternative method, namely a modification to the BITs which I will argue solves some of  the 
problems introduced by the BITs while still managing the original problem to a satisfying 
degree.   
 Evans, 2014, p. 98.7
!7
2. International investment law 
The body of  international investment law consists of  treaty based law as well as international 
custom. The treaty based law takes many forms, including Bilateral Investments Treaties 
(BITs), multilateral conventions and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). This is only to mention a 
few, but the differences is mostly in name only. Of  course, a BIT has per definition only two 
parties whereas the other forms can consist of  multiple parties. The rules in these different 
treaties are, on the other hand, quite similar.  8
When examining which are the applicable rules, and what they involve, treaty based law 
offers some guidance through the treaties themselves. But often one has to look at 
international custom when interpreting certain terms and expressions in the treaty.   9
2.1 Overview of  the history of  international investment law  
The history of  international investment law is one of  conflict where two principles have stood 
against each other.. The first principle is called the principle of  equality, which says that a host 
state needs to treat foreign investors in the same way as it treats its domestic investors. It also 
states that the state has no further obligations against foreign investors than it has against its 
own nationals. This principle was supported by Mexican foreign minister Eduardo Hay in a 
much quoted correspondence with US Secretary Cordell Hull in the 1930s, and stands in 
stark contrast to the principle put forward by Hull, which is the idea of  the international 
minimum standard. This latter principle or idea says that there is a certain level of  treatment 
that is mandatory to uphold against foreign investors, even if  this means that the host country 
needs to treat them better than their own nationals.  10
Both these principles were clearly biased, suiting the needs of  the countries supporting them. 
The developed countries, also called the capital exporting countries, favored the principle of  
the international minimum standards as these countries, and their nationals, had the most to 
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 43.8
 See art 31 in the Vienna Convention on the law of  treaties.9
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 49.10
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gain from it. They argued that even though it was not in their power nor in their interest to 
regulate how other countries treated their own nationals, it was in their interest (and to some 
extent, also in their power) to secure that the investments made by the capital exporting 
countries own nationals were protected by at least the international minimum standard. Its 
existence were dependent on however such a rule was to be found in international custom, 
and indeed many countries (foremost the U.S.) argued that the rule were applicable and acted 
accordingly.  11
But just as some countries argued forcibly that the rule was part of  international law, with the 
same fervor other countries denied it. As mentioned earlier, Mexico was one of  those 
countries which resisted the idea of  an international minimum standard. Most of  the Latin-
American countries, the post-colonial countries and the Soviet resisted the minimum standard 
and proposed their own view on the issue, which often had its roots in the principle of  
equality mentioned above. This battle between the two principles resulted in uncertainty 
regarding the applicable rules.  12
Some authors argue that this legal vacuum was the reason behind the increasing popularity 
of  BITs and other treaties which regulated foreign investments.  But the author Andrew T. 13
Guzman offers another perspective on the situation, arguing that the capital importing 
countries have very different incentives depending on whether they are acting as group or as 
individuals. Guzman notes that when the capital importing countries acts a collective, which 
they can do (and did) in the United Nations General Assembly, the collective can maximize 
their gains by resisting the international minimum standard and instead supporting a regime 
which gives the countries unconditional control of  their territory and resources. But when the 
countries act individually, the playing field changes drastically. Now the other capital 
importing countries are no longer their allies, they are their competitors. Since the market 
according to Guzman is competitive in favor of  the investors, the capital importing countries 
need to lure the investors to them and by signing a BIT they can give the investors a 
 Evans, 2014, p. 729.11
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 62-75.12
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 77. 13
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mechanism which lets them make sure that the host state keeps it promises. This is intended 
to give them an advantage over other countries which lack a BIT.  14
2.2 The content of  an investment treaty 
It is important to note that investment treaties and BITs do not simply establish the 
international minimum standard. The protection provided by the treaties goes further than 
the international minimum standard ever did, the most important difference is arguably the 
fact that treaties often include an investor-state arbitration clause. This clause gives the foreign 
investor the right to bring claims directly against the home state through international 
arbitration, while under the regime of  the international minimum standard the investor had 
to rely on their home state press claims against the host country. Indeed, under the 
international minimum standard it is the home state which has exclusive rights, and even if  a 
state would decide to press claims in favor of  the investor, any compensation paid goes to the 
home state, and not the investor. The investor is not a part of  the dispute.   15
By including an investor-state arbitration clause in the BIT, the home country does not need 
to act at all in case of  a dispute between host state and investor. This is a huge advantage for 
the investor, since the states and investors interests might not correspond. Even if  the country 
would see the investors claim as legitimate, they might choose not to pursue it because of  
political reasons. This effect is called the depoliticization of  the investment law, and it has 
been argued that this is one of  the main reason BITs gained such popularity in the first 
place.  16
2.2.1 Treatment standards  
The treaty often includes general standards of  treatment as well as specific treatment standards, the 
latter in regards to, inter alia, monetary transfers and  expropriation. The general  standard of  
treatment consist of  two kinds: absolute standards and relative standards. The absolute standards, 
such as fair and equitable treatment or guarantees of  full protection and security, sets a minimal standard 
 Guzman, 2009. pp. 1-25.14
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 93.15
 Sattorova, Mavluda. Return to the Local Remedies Rule in European BITs? Power (Inequalities), Dispute 16
Settlement and Change in Investment Treaty Law. Legal Issues of  Economic Integration 39, no 2 (2012). p. 226.
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of  treatment that the contracting parties must uphold. Exactly which level of  treatment the 
different terms corresponds to has been the subject of  debate, but there is some guidance to 
be found in commentaries, state practice and arbitral awards.  17
The level of  protection offered by the standard of  fair and equitable treatment is very 
interesting for the dynamic inconsistency problem since this standard imposes boundaries on 
the host states actions. This section I will begin by borrowing some appropriate words from 
Jeswald Salacuse regarding three problems with interpreting the clause: 
First the term ’fair and equitable’ is, one may say without exaggeration, maddeningly 
vague, frustratingly general and treacherously elastic. Second, the treaty provisions 
and the agreements in which the terms are embedded offer no definition for them, 
nor any real guidance on how to apply them. Third, despite the abundant scholarly 
commentary on the subject and a growing volume of  arbitral decisions, application 
of  the fair and equitable standard is so tied to the facts of  the specific cases as to limit 
the utility of  the arbitral decisions and doctrinal analysis.   18
With that said, some principles have commonly been used in the arbitrators reasoning as to 
whether a states practice has violated the fair and equitable standard or not. Salacuse has 
identified five principles commonly used by arbitrators when examining state actions. Has the 
state: ”(1) failed to protect the investor’s legitimate expectations; (2) failed to act transparently; 
(3) acted arbitrarily or subjected the investor to discriminatory treatment; (4) denied the 
investor access to justice or procedural due process; or (5) acted in bad faith”?   19
Let us have a short look at (1), the principle of  legitimate expectations. The expectations can 
originate from the host states laws, regulations or other actions taken during the pre-
investment phase. By creating expectations through favorable regulations, the host state 
commits not to change or alter the favorable regulation to such a degree that they no longer 
correspond to the investors legitimate expectations. On the other hand, it is not required for 
the state to freeze its legal system either, instead one needs to inquire about the states 
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 131.17
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 221.18
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 230.19
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reasonable right to regulate and the investors reasonable expectations. To discern whether the 
expectations are legitimate expectations one needs to discern if  the action falls within the concept 
of  reasonable regulations. For example, bringing ”environmental regulations [up] to 
internationally accepted standards”  constitutes a reasonable regulation, ergo such an action 20
would not constitute a breach against the principle of  respecting investors legitimate 
expectations.   
The relative standards includes the MFN-clause mentioned above and the national treatment 
clause. These are relative in the sense that they do not set a certain standard of  treatment or 
conduct, instead they are intended to guarantee that the investor will  not be treated worse 
than either another foreign investor or a national of  the host country. The national treatment 
clause states that the investor will not be treated worse than the host states own nationals. The 
most favored nation clause on the other hand states that an investor will not be treated worse 
than any other foreign investor.  21
2.2.2 Regulations regarding expropriation 
Expropriation is allowed, assuming that it fulfills certain criteria. The "Hull Formula”, which 
states that payment must be ”prompt, adequate and effective”, is commonly used in BITs and 
other investment treaties.  Further, it must be ”for a purpose which is in the public interest”, 22
not be discriminatory and done in accordance with due process of  law.   23
Direct expropriation today is rather uncommon (or at least not very problematic), but indirect 
expropriation presents a few difficulties. Direct expropriation includes a taking of  property, 
where the property at hand can constitute a material object as well as, inter alia, intellectual 
property and contractual property. Indirect expropriation is when the host state is using its 
regulatory or legislative powers to derive benefits from the investor and claim these benefits 
for themselves, without change to the legal relationship between the investor and the 
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 233.20
 Salacuse, 2010, p 133.21
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 135.22
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 289.23
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investment.  When determining whether an action constitutes indirect expropriation or not 24
the arbitrators usually focus more on the effects the alleged action has on the investment, than 
on the intent of  the host state or the form of  the action.   25
An example of  indirect expropriation could be that through elevating taxes and fees removing 
any possible profits from the investment, thus removing any reason to actually own it. Usually 
the host state would deny that indirect expropriation is even taking place, but if  an investor 
sues the host state through investor-state arbitration and the arbitrators finds that an indirect 
expropriation is indeed occurring, ”prompt, adequate and effective” compensation will have 
to be paid for the investors expenses.   
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 297.24
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 298.25
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3. Criticism against the 
investment treaties  
Investment treaties have been attacked on at least three fronts: 
1. The arbitration system is biased. 
2. The substantive rules in the treaties impose too much constraint on the host states actions. 
3. The  financial costs are too high, both in regards to the compensation and to the costs for 
the proceedings.  
  
Basically, criticism has been raised in regards to the entire system of  treaty based international 
investment law. To make matters even worse, it has been claimed that the system fails at its 
very purpose; to promote investment. This is a question which one should be able to resolve 
through empiric studies, but the studies made have been criticized.  In light of  this I will 26
leave that argument untouched, instead I will assume for the sake of  argument that 
investment treaties indeed do promote investment. 
3.1 Criticism against the arbitration system  
The strongest criticism against the arbitration system in my view is that it is biased in favor of  
the developed countries.  On a further note, not just the arbitration system but many BIT 27
themselves favor the developed party, for example by excluding many important sectors from 
the scope of  the investment treaty within the developed states jurisdiction but not within the 
developing states jurisdiction.  28
Another issue is the structure of  ICSID, where the majority of  the investor-state disputes are 
settled, and the fact that most BITs let the investor choose arbitration method, thus enabling 
them to force countries into ICSID arbitration rather than ad hoc arbitration. There are two 
 Van Harten, Guz. Five Justifications For Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion. Trade, Law and Development, 26
Vol II:19 (Spring 2010). pp. 28-35. 
 Sattorova, 2012, p. 229.27
 Van Harten, 2010, pp. 42-45.28
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elements common to domestic systems which are lacking in international arbitration: the 
possibility to appeal and prejudicial awards. One could argue that these two components 
should be (better) implemented into ICSID, and even though I can certainly see the appeal I 
believe there is a reason for the these components being excluded from the system. ICSID 
helps the parties with the arbitration, but it is not ICSID that is responsible for the awards, the 
arbitrators are. In a sense, this is part of  the problem, but it is also a way of  ensuring that the 
parties get a neutral process. If  one were to introduce an institute where the institute were 
responsible for the awards, and where the above mentioned components were implemented, 
one would be creating an international court of  justice only dealing with investment law. 
There would always be a suspicion that such an institute would have a hidden agenda of  
trying to make all other countries adhere to the creators domestic law and/or political 
policies. By keeping the institute and arbitrators separate, one can avoid such criticism.  
Moreover, the investor-arbitration clause has caused commotion since some countries think it 
is unreasonable to grant rights to foreign investors not available to domestic investors. This 
has led countries to reject investor-state arbitration.  Australia rejected this system because 29
Australia does not want to be sued by investors through investor-state arbitration, most 
notably is the Philip Morris case which is the source of  some controversy. But by rejecting this 
clause, Australian investors will lose the protection that investor-arbitrations grants them. 
While I agree that it seems unfair to grant foreign investors rights which are not available to 
domestic investors, I believe that abandoning the investor-state arbitration system comes at 
too high a cost. In an ideal world, all domestic courts would be free from corruption and 
would without exemptions apply the rule of  law. But until that point, I would say arbitration 
is not a bad option (even though the system surrounding it today could use some 
improvements). The goal of  international arbitration should be to uphold an international 
minimum standard of  due process, granting foreign investors the option to choose whether to 
rely on the domestic courts or international arbitration. But for this to work properly (not 
making foreign investors choose international arbitration as standard) the arbitration system 
needs to get rid of  its reputation as biased in favor of  investors (and capital exporting 
countries). And I see no reason not to include a clause in the BIT which forces the investor to 
 Trakman, Leon. Investor State Arbitration or Local Courts: Will Australia Set a New Trend? Journal of  World 29
Trade 46, no 1 (2012). p 85. 
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exhaust local remedies first,  possibly combined with certain other conditions which let the 30
arbitrators reject a claim if  they find that justice has been found during the domestic process 
but also conditions which let an investor bypass local remedies if  it can be shown that the 
investor can not find justice through those means, for example if  the process is too slow.   31
3.2 Criticism against the substantive rules in the 
investment treaties 
There is a fear that the rules in the investment treaties impose too much constraint on the host 
states actions. This impedes the possibility for the state to improve its internal legalization, to 
such a degree that it might be harmful for the state and its citizens.  Some of  the rules one 32
might refer to in this instance is those regarding expropriation (direct and indirect, "creeping" 
and partial) and the general treatment standards, most notably the fair and equitable 
standard. The scope of  these provisions is not entirely clear, and though interesting there is 
not enough room to discuss that issue here.  
The problem is twofold: there is a fear that these provisions impose too much constraint on 
the host state actions in themselves, but there is also the fear that the host state chooses not to 
implement certain legislation (which would benefit its citizens), fearing that new legislation 
could provide a breach of  the investment treaty.  This latter mentioned problem is one of  33
theory only, since there has been no empirical survey regarding this issue as far as I know. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the scope of  some of  the provisions in the investment treaty are 
unclear could very well have an impact on how states use their legislative power. Indeed, if  
one were to say that investment treaties in general do not affect the host states use of  its 
legislative power, there would almost be no point in signing investment treaties.  
 A clause which is common but not always included in BITs. See Sattorova, 2012. 30
 Justice delayed is justice denied, but one should note that even ICSID arbitration has been criticized for being 31
a lengthy process.  
 See Chinen, Mark. Complexity Theory and the Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of  State Responsibility. 32
The European Journal of  International Law. Vol. 25 no. 3 (2014). 
 Salacuse, 2010, p.121.33
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There are two solutions, according to me, to these above mentioned two problems: either one 
changes the substantive rules in a way which is satisfactory, and then one needs a system to 
make sure that the rules are applied in a consistent manner. This might be a larger issue, one 
which leads us back to the problems with the current state international arbitration. Unless 
the treaty is unquestionably clear (can there be such a thing?) the treaties will need to be 
interpreted, and since there is no obligation for an arbitrator to follow an earlier award there 
is no way to ensure that the interpretation will be predictable and consistent.  
The second solution is maybe not so much a solution as a remedy, and that is a change in the 
calculation of  compensation. This idea will be elaborated further on, but the concept is that 
in lowering the amount of  compensation that the host state needs to pay when it has been 
settled that a treaty breach has occurred, one remedies both of  the above mentioned two 
problems. A state which faces the problem that it does not know whether it's new legislation 
might constitute a treaty breach is encouraged to legislate in the modified system when 
compared to the current system. Of  course, the compensation cannot be lowered in all cases, 
since that might allow a state to ignore the system entirely (for example by introducing new 
legislation that will increase the taxes in a way which constitutes a breach of  the treaty, since 
if  compensation is not paid in full in such a scenario the state will always increase its cash flow 
and there will never be a financial reason for the state not to breach the treaty).  
3.3 Criticism against the costs of  investor-state arbitration  
Authors have argued against a regime of  international investment law in its current form, 
based on the idea that the investment treaties impede the host countries ability to change its 
laws, consequently making it harder for the country to improve, inter alia, the working 
conditions for the workers or the protection for the environment.  The main issue is in 34
regard to the ability for the investor to sue a host state through international arbitration, and 
that the investor through these means might be able to get a considerable amount of  
compensation. The protection that the investor gains can potentially be very costly for the 
host country.  
 See for example Choudhury, Barnali. Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of  34
the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit? Vanderbilt Journal Of  Transnational Law. Vol. 41:775 
(2008) especially pp. 792-797 and Van Harten, 2010.
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The costs associated with investor-arbitration are of  different character. For starters, there is 
the issue of  the costs for the procedure and the legal representation. These costs in themselves 
can be notoriously high, one of  the extreme cases being CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech 
Republic in which the Czech Republic allegedly spent US$ 10 million on its legal defense 
alone. But even when looking at a case which might be more representative, for example Int'l 
Thunderbird Gaming Corp v United Mexican States, the figures are far from low. In this latter 
mentioned case the costs for the proceedings, including the legal representation of  both sides 
and arbitrators fees, was US$ 3.17 million.  35
The main threat an investor can use against the host country is that it better behave, 
otherwise it is going to be costly. Regarding this threat from the investor, there is the fact that 
the procedure itself  is costly. On the other hand, this is a costly process for the investor as well. 
So even though the costs of  the procedure of  course will add to the sum of  all the costs in the 
end, this is balanced by the fact that it is a costly process for the investor as much as for the 
host state, encouraging him or her not to sue in the first place. This means that even though 
the high costs of  the process are problematic in many ways, when it comes to its effects on the 
dynamic inconsistency problem these effects might not be too severe. 
The costs for the proceedings (arbitration fees, legal representation) have been criticized for 
being too high.  This is an unnecessary expense both on the part of  the investor as well as 36
the host state. In effect, it also closes the door for many investment disputes on two grounds: 
1. there must be a certain amount of  expected payoff, otherwise it will no longer be profitable 
for the investor (the risk might be too high in regard to the possible earnings) and 2. investors 
might not afford these high costs even though they expect to win the award. 
The other problem in regard to the costs is that the amount of  compensation that the host 
state needs to pay in case of  a treaty breach can reach notoriously high sums, one of  the most 
controversial being CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic where the host state had to 
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 119.35
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 119.36
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pay US$ 269 million in compensation.  This case is controversial not only because of  the 37
high compensation, but also because there was a second proceeding with the same parties and 
the same circumstances, Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic. This second proceeding was not 
dismissed because of  res judicata, instead the same circumstances was tried twice. But in the 
second proceeding, the claimant lost. Other awards where the claimant won high amounts of  
compensation are Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador (US$ 1.7 billion), CMS Gas Transmission Co. 
v. Argentina (US$ 133.2 million) and Ioan Micula and others v. Romania (US$ 99 million).  These 
high sums can damage the legitimacy of  the investment law regime, especially if  one also 
considers that the investor-state arbitration system has been criticized for being biased in favor 
of  the investors.  But not only can the awards amount to ridiculously high sums, the 38
arbitrators have been further criticized for not applying any valuation standards when 
evaluating damages consistently.   39
 Crawford, James. Ten investment arbitration awards that Shook the World: Introduction and Overview. 37
Dispute Resolution International. Vol. 4 no. 1 (May 2010) p. 94.
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Vol 14:355 (2014). 
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4. Suggestions and Conclusion 
4.1 Suggestions on how to change the system  
First, one needs a consistent system in regard to the valuation of  assets. Author Pan (2014) 
suggests the so called ”White Book”, which is maintained by The International Valuation Standards 
Council. I see no reason not to apply these rules, but I must stress the fact that the important 
part is that the arbitrators choose to apply any rules consistently. This so that both investors 
and states may predict the costs and benefits of  investor-state arbitration.  
Secondly, I would recommend introducing a new clause in the international investment 
treaties, which says not only that arbitrators may but that they should lower the amount of  
compensation to be paid should the amount be so high that it can be viewed as an adequate 
damage to the host state. This means that whether the compensations is to be considered an 
adequate damage or not one needs to look at the host state resources and financial situation. 
Of  course it is the host state which would need to prove this. Hopefully this does not need to 
include too much trouble, I can image that the question could be settled by examining inter 
alia the country's public state budget and other official documents.  
Unfortunately, there is a risk that the clause would be used arbitrarily by the arbitrators. To 
some degree this is unavoidable, but I would recommend that the treaty include a description 
of  different factors that the arbitrators should consider when evaluating whether the 
compensation constitutes an adequate damage or not. For the sake of  flexibility, I do not 
believe that it is possible to introduce such a rule without leaving some room for the 
arbitrators discretion. This also means that how much the compensation should be lowered 
will also be at the arbitrators discretion, but the intention is that it should be lowered until it 
no longer constitutes an adequate damage for the host state. 
By introducing the above mentioned clause into the treaties one could potentially deal with 
some of  the criticism against investor-state arbitration. One of  the issues this modification 
deals with is the problem with host states neglecting to use their legislative power for the 
benefits of  its citizens. As mentioned, there is a fear that the rules in the investment treaties 
impede the host state actions too much, the state fearing reprisals if  their new legislation 
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would constitute a breach of  an investment treaty. For example, when determining whether 
there has been a breach of  the fair and equitable treatment standard, one looks at the 
investors legitimate expectations. One can easily imagine a situation in which a host state 
considers new legislation which is unfavorable for the investor but which benefits the states 
citizens. My intentions are that in such a scenario, where it is unsure whether the new 
legislation would constitute a breach of  the principle of  legitimate expectations (and thus 
constituting a treaty breach), the host state now feels that the risk of  the new legislation is 
worth taking, considering that even if  a breach occurs it no longer has to fear that it will be 
forced to pay a very high amount of  compensation. By lowering the compensation the state is 
encouraged (to some extent) to disregard the treaty, and can act and utilize its legislative 
powers in a way that the state finds most efficient. But it still needs to consider the treaty, since 
there is still the risk that they might be sued and be forced to pay compensation. But this is 
also the protection required by investors, otherwise the treaties would be null. Plenty of  
investors would still be protected by the treaties since in most cases the amount of  
compensation would not constitute an adequate damage to the host state. This would also 
add another factor for the investor to consider when he or she decide whether to invest in a 
country or not, should the investment be very large and the country's  economy limited, there 
is a substantial risk for the investor that it might not get full compensation paid in case of  a 
dispute between the investor and the host-state. But on the other hand, in these scenarios 
there is a chance that the investment might be considered so important for the host-state that 
the state and the investor comes to an agreement that any compensation should be paid in 
full. Ergo, a contract (which changes the rules regarding the calculation of  compensation) 
between an investor and a state should still apply even if  its rules were contradictory to the 
rules in the investment treaty. But in this scenario, it is easier for the host state to do a 
thorough cost and benefit analysis before signing a contract.  
My suggestion is primarily introduced to deal with cases like CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The 
Czech Republic, where the Czech Republic had to pay US$ 269,814,000 in compensation. Just 
seeing these numbers (and knowing that it has been said that the amount is roughly 
comparable to the country’s health budget for a year) , this kind of  compensation does not 40
seem just. I think there is a moral reason to change the system in favor of  the host state. Most 
 Crawford, 2010, p. 94. 40
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countries spread the costs among their citizens: if  the country has a public health care system, 
the costs of  this health care system is spread among its citizens through taxes and other public 
fees. This holds for most domestic systems: public services are financed by taxation of  their 
members. Some authors even go so far as to claim that by being forced to pay a huge award 
the country might not be able to guarantee that its citizens human rights are not violated.  If  41
the compensation that the host state has to pay to the investor is so high that it is felt by its 
citizens, the system cannot be justified on utilitarian moral grounds. 
The modification is done at the expense of  the investors, these would after the modification 
has been introduced always be at a disadvantage compared to if  the new rule would not 
apply. But in the long run, I think that this is a price the investors should be willing to pay if  it 
can keep the investment treaty regime up and running. With Australia abandoning the 
investor-state arbitration clause and other countries questioning investment treaties altogether, 
more countries might feel compelled to stop signing investment treaties and not renew the 
ones they have already signed.  If  one wants to uphold the investment treaty regime as an 42
international standard, I believe the system needs to be changed in favor of  the host states. It 
is after all states, and not investors, who sign the treaties. It is up to them to uphold or 
abandon the system. 
4.2 Conclusion 
Investment treaties have been credited for liberalizing the policies of  countries that sign them. 
And depending on whether you oppose or encourage this process, this will influence your 
opinion about investment treaties. I oppose this process. Or rather, I do not believe that it is a 
process which only bring benefits. Investment treaties transfer some of  the state powers unto 
investors. Investors, sometimes multinational cooperations like Philip Morris Limited, get rights 
and states get obligations. One could argue that states ought not to sign investment treaties at 
all, since they do not gain anything from signing. On this point though, I disagree. I believe 
that the host state and its citizens may gain from signing investment treaties and thus gaining 
investments, which hopefully generates jobs and income for both states and citizens alike. On 
this note, I do not oppose investment treaties. But on the other hand I do not think that states 
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today pay a reasonable price for this investment. I believe that as it stands today, investment 
treaties grant too much power to the investor and limits the host states actions too much. 
There should be an instrument which lets investors feel safer when investing in a foreign 
country, such as an investment treaty, but at the same time the host state should not feel that 
signing an investment treaty limits its actions when it concerns safeguarding certain interests 
which benefit the citizens or the environment. By lowering the amount of  compensation in 
case of  a treaty breach, some of  the ”teeth” are removed from the system and it is now harder 
for investors to pose as a threat towards host states legislations. Host states are freer in their 
actions yet investors are not left without protection.  
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